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Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that the book-to-market ratio predicts returns 
because it proxies for intangible returns, which may capture market overreaction to 
intangible information that is not reflected in accounting-based growth measures. 
This thesis investigates how institutional investors’ trading behavior is related to 
market overreaction to intangible information.  According to the efficient markets 
hypothesis, we would expect institutions to trade against this mispricing. In contrast, 
the delegated portfolio management literature suggests that institutions might trade in 
the direction of this mispricing.  
The results show that institutional investors tend to buy (sell) stocks in herds in 
response to positive (negative) intangible information. Stated alternatively, rather 
than trade against mispricing, institutional investors trade in the direction of the 
mispricing. Their trading, therefore, tends to exacerbate market overreaction to 
intangible information. 
The response of institutional ownership to intangible information is not only 
statistically but also economically significant. For stocks with highest past 5-year 
intangible returns, the market-adjusted (i.e., cross-sectionally demeaned) institutional 
ownership increased from below -2% to above 2% during the 5-year ranking period. 
For stocks experiencing lowest past 5-year intangible returns, the market-adjusted 
institutional ownership decreased from around zero to -6% over the 5-year ranking 
window. Estimates from a vector autoregressive model of returns, intangible returns 
and institutional ownership reveal stronger institutional response to intangible 
information than the event-study results. 
 v
To examine the interaction of institutional trading and market overreaction to 
intangible information, I independently sort stocks into 25 portfolios based on past 
intangible returns and the level of institutional herding. For stocks with high level of 
institutional herding, a zero-cost portfolio buying low intangible-return stocks and 
shorting high intangible-return stocks yields an annual return of 11.1% and an annual 
Carhart 4-factor alpha of 7.7%.  A similar strategy using low institutional-herding 
stocks generates an annual return of only 5.2% and an annual 4-factor alpha of only 
2.8%. The results reveal an important link between institutional trading (herding) and 
the book-to-market effect.  
This thesis contributes to the asset pricing literature by offering another 
explanation of the book-to-market effect. The growing literature explaining the book-
to-market effect has provided risk-based explanations and behavioral explanations 
that focus on the psychological biases of naïve investors, presumably individuals. 
This study shows that the conformist trading behavior of institutional investors can 
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The empirical regularity that stocks with high book-to-market ratios earn higher average 
returns than stocks with low book-to-market ratios, i.e., the book-to-market effect, has 
attracted much attention in the recent decade. After over ten years of research, the 
interpretation of this evidence remains highly controversial. 1  Neither rational nor 
behavioral explanations clearly dominate (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996, and 1997 for rational explanations; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, and 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998 etc. for behavioral explanations). Nevertheless, an 
emerging body of empirical literature such as Daniel and Titman (2006) and La Porta et 
al. (1997) suggests that market overreaction is an important source of the superior 
performance of high book-to-market stocks relative to low book-to-market stocks. 
To understand market overreaction, it is important to examine the trading behavior 
of market participants. This study investigates the trading behavior of institutional 
investors, which are becoming increasingly important in equity markets.2  In Particular,
                                                 
1 This controversy exists not only among financial researchers but also among financial practitioners. For 
example, the LSV Asset Management tilted its portfolios toward value stocks, e.g., stocks with high book-
to-market ratios, and claimed that "superior long-term results can be achieved by systematically exploiting 
the judgmental biases and behavioral weaknesses that influence the decisions of many investors" 
(http://www.lsvasset.com/jsps/about/investphilo.jsp). On the other side, index funds based on the Fama and 
French size/book-to-market-sorted factors, whose investment philosophy upholds market efficiency, have 
been enjoying increasing popularity among investors seeking the benefits of diversification and risk sharing. 
 
2 Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in institutional ownership in equity markets. At the 
end of 2004, the average fraction of shares owned by institutional investors in US equity markets was 53%, 
more than doubling from 20% as of the end of 1980. In terms of trading volume, institutional investors 
accounted for over 70% of the trading activity on the NYSE in 1989 (Schwartz and Shapiro, 1992). In 2002, 
the proportion of NYSE trading volume due to nonretail trading increased to 96% (Jones and Lipson, 2004). 
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I address the following question: given that previous empirical evidence suggests that 
market overreaction is a driving force of the book-to-market effect, do sophisticated 
players in the stock market, namely institutional investors, trade against this 
mispricing? 
In theory, the answer to this question is not clear. The efficient markets 
hypothesis posits that sophisticated investors, presumably institutional investors, exert 
a correcting force in financial markets, arbitraging away mispricings and pushing 
asset prices towards fundamental values (see, e.g., Friedman, 1953; Fama, 1965). In 
contrast, the literature on limits to arbitrage argues that, various risks, costs and 
agency problems can prevent arbitrageurs from effectively arbitraging away 
deviations from fundamental values. Moreover, the herding literature shows that, 
under delegated portfolio management, individual investment managers might find it 
optimal to herd with the market, exerting a destabilizing effect on asset prices. 
Given the mixed theoretical results, this thesis provides an empirical answer to 
this question. According to the efficient markets hypothesis, we would expect 
institutions to trade against the mispricing. In contrast, the herding literature suggests 
that institutions might trade in the direction of the mispricing. The unique feature of 
the empirical design is the focus on market overreaction to intangible information, 
which has been shown by Daniel and Titman (2006) to drive the book-to-market 
effect. Since tangible information has virtually no relation to variation in future stock 
returns, discriminating between tangible and intangible information helps to increase 
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the power of this study to identify the relation between institutional trading and return 
predictability in the cross-section.3 
I find that institutional investors buy shares in response to positive intangible 
information and sell shares in response to negative intangible information. Stated 
alternatively, rather than trade against mispricing, institutional investors trade in the 
direction of the mispricing. Their trading, therefore, tends to exacerbate market 
overreaction to intangible information. 
The response of institutional ownership to intangible information is not only 
statistically but also economically significant. For stocks with highest past 5-year 
intangible returns, the market-adjusted (i.e., cross-sectionally demeaned) institutional 
ownership increased from below -2% to above 2% during the 5-year ranking period. 
For stocks experiencing lowest past 5-year intangible returns, the market-adjusted 
institutional ownership decreased from around zero to -6% over the 5-year ranking 
window. Estimates from a vector autoregressive model of returns, intangible returns 
and institutional ownership reveal stronger institutional response to intangible 
information than the event-study results. 
The fact that institutional investors are joining the market, amplifying the 
magnitude of mispricing, is consistent with the theoretical models of agency-based 
herding.4  Suppose that rational investment managers understand that stock prices 
                                                 
3 The recent theoretical work by Epstein and Schneider (2006) also follows the distinction of tangible 
and intangible information emphasized by Daniel and Titman (2006), and focuses on how agents 
process intangible information. 
 
4 This fact is also consistent with the model of Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990). 
Delong et al. demonstrate that sophisticated investors can "jump on the bandwagon" and unload their 
shares before the price peak, exploiting predictable investor sentiment and destabilizing asset prices. 
Both types of models predict that institutional investment managers may trade in the direction of 
mispricing. I leave the discrimination between the two types of models for future research. 
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have overreacted to intangible information.5  However, they invest on the behalf of 
their clients and, therefore, care about their reputation in the labor markets in addition 
to the investment outcome. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that investment 
managers with reputational concerns can under some circumstances discard their own 
judgments (e.g., the belief that stock price has overreacted to intangible information) 
and mimic the behavior of others, exhibiting herding behavior. They also show that, 
due to the "sharing-the-blame" effect, this tendency for investment managers to herd 
is stronger when there are more uncertainties about the investment outcome. Based on 
their model, it stands to reason that the arrival of intangible information may induce 
institutional managers to trade in herds, exacerbating market overreaction to 
intangible information: since intangible information is associated with more 
underlying uncertainties, trading against intangible information might be more 
difficult for managers to justify to their clients. 
To test for this prediction, I examine stock holdings at the level of individual 
investment managers and investigate the relation between institutional herding and 
intangible information. I find that the tendency of institutions to buy stocks in herds is 
increasing in past intangible returns, whereas the tendency of institutions to sell in 
herds is decreasing in past intangible returns. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that positive intangible information tends to trigger institutional herding 
on the buy side, whereas negative intangible information tends to trigger institutional 
herding on the sell side. 
                                                 
5 If investment managers are systematically prone to the psychological biases such as overconfidence 
about intangible information or have intrinsic preferences for conformity to the market, the observed 
institutional behavior at the aggregate level is easily explained. However, it is more interesting to 
explain the aggregate institutional behavior assuming rationality of professional investment managers. 
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Based on the observed trading behavior of institutions, it is possible that trades 
by institutions impact stock prices and intensify market overreaction to intangible 
information. To examine this conjecture, I independently sort stocks into 25 
portfolios based on past 1-year intangible returns and the level of institutional herding. 
I then construct five zero-cost portfolios buying low intangible-return stocks and 
selling short high intangible-return stocks, conditional on the level of institutional 
herding. For stocks with high level of institutional herding, this investment strategy 
yields an average annual return of 11.1% and an annual Carhart 4-factor alpha of 
7.7%, which is statistically different from zero. A similar strategy using stocks with 
low level of institutional herding generates an average annual return of only 5.2% and 
an annual Carhart 4-factor alpha of only 2.8%, which is not statistically different from 
zero. 6 The results indicate strong interaction effects between institutional herding and 
market overreaction to intangible information, and reveal an important link between 
institutional trading (herding) and the book-to-market effect.7 
It should be noted that the level of institutional herding has very low correlation 
with the level of institutional ownership, due to the unsigned nature of the LSV 
herding measure. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the level of 
institutional herding and the end-of-period institutional ownership is only 0.5%. 
Therefore, the finding of this thesis that mispricings are more significant for stocks 
                                                 
6 Based on the Daniel et al. (1997) risk adjustment procedure, I find that the DGTW alpha is 8% 
(t=4.06) per year for the long/short portfolio using high institutional-herding stocks, whereas the 
DGTW alpha is only 2.73% (t=1.55) per year for a similar investment strategy using low institutional-
herding stocks. 
 
7 I also construct 25 portfolios based on two-way independent sorts on book-to-market ratios and the 
level of institutional herding. The results show that the difference in returns on high and low book-to-
market stocks is also increasing in the level of institutional herding. This finding is not surprising and 
unreported, since Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that the book-to-market ratio predicts returns 
because it proxies for intangible returns. The results are available upon request. 
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with higher level of institutional herding is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
literature reporting a negative correlation between the level of institutional ownership 
and mispricings (see, e.g., Ali, Hwang, and Trombley, 2003, and Nagel, 2005). 
One might wonder whether the intangible component of stock returns, as 
constructed by Daniel and Titman, simply reflects the impact of trades by institutions. 
More generally stated, what do intangible returns capture? To better understand the 
nature of intangible returns, I first conduct Granger causality test of intangible returns 
and institutional ownership. I find that intangible returns Granger-cause institutional 
ownership, but institutional ownership does not Granger-cause intangible returns. The 
test, therefore, rejects the hypothesis that intangible returns simply reflect the trading 
impact of institutions. I also examine the industry distribution of stocks with extreme 
intangible returns and relate intangible returns to other variables associated with value 
ambiguity. I find that extreme intangible returns are most likely to happen for firms in 
the computer software industry, computer hardware industry and pharmaceutical 
industry. Moreover, firms with extreme intangible returns tend to have 
disproportionally higher R&D expenditures, trading volume, return volatility, and 
dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts. The results indicate that intangible returns 
capture realizations of past information that is vague or ambiguous, and are consistent 
with the conjecture of Daniel and Titman that intangible information is likely to be 
related to firms' growth options.     
The aim of this study is to uncover cross-sectional evidence on the relation 
between stock returns and institutional trading. However, the sample in this study 
(from 1981 to 2004) covers a period with sustained price runups of technology stocks, 
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followed by a large price decline, a period often referred to as the Internet bubble 
period. There is some evidence that institutions rode the price bubble of technology 
stocks (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). These issues raise the concern that the time-
series event may drive the results. To address this concern, I split the sample into two 
subperiods, 1981-1992 and 1993-2004, and repeat the analysis for each subperiod. 
The results are qualitatively similar for both periods, indicating that the Internet 
bubble does not drive the results of this study. 
This thesis contributes to the asset pricing literature by offering another 
explanation of the book-to-market effect. The growing literature explaining the book-
to-market effect has provided risk-based explanations and behavioral explanations 
that focus on the psychological biases of naïve investors, presumably individuals. 
This study shows that the conformist trading behavior of institutional investors can 
intensify market overreaction, leading to the book-to-market effect. 
This thesis also contributes to the empirical literature that investigates the 
trading impact of institutional investors. This strand of literature has produced mixed 
results regarding whether institutional trading tends to move asset prices away from 
or towards fundamental values. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) find that 
institutional investors exploit individual investors' underreaction to cash flow news by 
purchasing shares with positive cash flow news and selling shares with negative cash 
flow news. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2004) report that institutions that trade actively 
exploit the post-earnings announcement drift. In contrast, Frazzini (2006) shows that 
the disposition effect, i.e., the tendency to realize capital gains but hold on to losses, 
of mutual fund managers intensifies the post-earning announcement drift. Extracting 
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hedge fund holdings from 13f data, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that hedge 
funds rode the technology bubble and therefore destabilized prices of technology 
stocks. This study provides additional evidence that trades by institutional investors 
can destabilize asset prices, leading to return predictability. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of the 
related literature in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents an overview of the relation between 
institutional trading and intangible information. In Chapter 4, I investigate the joint 
dynamics of institutional trading, intangible information and stock returns using a 
firm-level VAR model. Chapter 5 relates institutional herding to intangible 
information, exploring a possible reason for the aggregate institutional response to 
intangible information. In Chapter 6, I provide evidence on the interaction effects 
between institutional trading (herding) and market overreaction to intangible 
information, which reveals a link between institutional trading and the book-to-
market effect. In Chapter 7, I examine the robustness of my results based on the 
herding and VAR analyses to a number of changes in the experimental design. 





This chapter presents a brief review of the literature on the book-to-market effect and 
institutional trading. Since both the literature on the book-to-market effect and the 
literature on institutional trading are vast, this chapter selectively reviews the 
literature based the relevance to the thesis. 
 
2.1 Literature on the Book-to-Market Effect 
Two influential explanations of the book-to-market effect have been proposed in the 
literature. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), among others, argue that the book-to-market effect arises from investors' 
extrapolative expectations about firms' fundamental growth prospects. According to 
them, investors irrationally extrapolate firms' past fundamental growth and thus 
undervalue stocks that have performed poorly in the past. These firms tend to have 
high book-to-market ratios and subsequently outperform once their actual 
fundamental growth pleasantly surprises investors. 8  In their model and empirical 
work, the book-to-market effect is a manifestation of stock market overreaction to 
firms' fundamental performance. 
Without resorting to market inefficiency, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996, and 1997) propose that firms with high book-to-market ratios are 
                                                 
8 Subsequent works by La Porta et al. (1997) and Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2005) find direct 
evidence of expectation errors on the part of financial analysts, supporting the overreaction story. 
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fundamentally riskier because of their poor past fundamental performance. This risk 
of financial distress is likely to be a priced risk factor. Therefore, the high expected 
returns on stocks with high book-to-market ratios reflect the fair compensation for the 
risk of relative distress investors bear when they hold these stocks.9 
As pointed out by Daniel and Titman (2006), these explanations, though 
different in nature about the underlying assumptions of investor behavior, share an 
important common element: the high returns on high book-to-market stocks are 
related to firms' past fundamental performance, such as poor earnings performance. 
The behavioral explanation argues that stock market overreacts to firms' accounting-
based growth rates and the rational explanation is based on the argument that poor 
past fundamental performance leads to increased risk of financial distress. 
Understanding different reasons why stock prices move helps to understand 
why the book-to-market ratio is related with future returns. The log book-to-market 
ratio of firm i at time t can be decomposed into its book-to-market ratio at time 0, plus 
the change in book value, minus the change in market value, that is log(Bi,t/Mi,t) ≡ 
bmi,t = bmi,0 + Δbi ─ Δmi, where Δbi refers to changes in log book value, and Δmi 
refers to changes in log market value. If we ignore the cross-sectional difference in 
book-to-market ratios at time 0, bmi,0, the cross-sectional dispersion in book-to-
market ratios results from a combination of changes in accounting value and changes 
in market value. Therefore, the book-to-market ratios vary cross-sectionally either 
because of information contained in firms' accounting-based performance or because 
                                                 
9 Subsequent research on the relation between the book-to-market effect and distress risk has produced 
mixed results. For example, Vassalou and Xing (2004) show that the book-to-market effect is largely a 
default effect, whereas Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2006) find evidence inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the value premium as compensation for distress risk. 
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of information orthogonal to firms' accounting-based performance but reflected in the 
changes of firm value. 
Daniel and Titman (2006) label the information contained in firms' accounting-
based performance as tangible information, the information orthogonal to firms' 
accounting-based performance as intangible information, and decompose stock 
returns into tangible and intangible components. Armed with this return 
decomposition, they re-examine the book-to-market effect by testing whether the 
book-to-market ratio forecasts future returns due to the tangible or intangible part of 
returns. They find no relation between the tangible return and future returns. Instead, 
they report that the intangible return is strongly and negatively related to future 
returns, driving the return forecasting power of the book-to-market ratio. They also 
show that the strong reversal of intangible returns cannot be explained by existing 
asset pricing models. Therefore, their evidence is more consistent with the 
interpretation that the book-to-market effect arises from market overreaction to 
intangible information. 
 
2.2 Literature on Institutional Trading 
Does institutional trading tend to move asset prices towards or away from 
fundamental values? The literature addressing this question has produced mixed 
results. From the theoretical point of view, the efficient markets hypothesis posits that 
sophisticated investors, presumably institutional investors, exert a correcting force in 
financial markets, arbitraging away mispricings and pushing asset prices towards 
fundamental values (see, e.g., Friedman, 1953; Fama, 1965). In contrast, the literature 
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on limits to arbitrage argues that, various risks, costs and agency problems can 
prevent arbitrageurs from effectively arbitraging away deviations from fundamental 
values. Moreover, the herding literature shows that, under delegated portfolio 
management, individual investment managers might find it optimal to herd with the 
market, exerting a destabilizing effect on asset prices. Similarly, Delong, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman (1990) demonstrate that rational investors can "jump on the 
bandwagon" and unload their shares before the peak of asset prices, exploiting 
predictable sentiments of positive feedback traders. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) 
reach a similar conclusion in the context of price bubbles. 
From an empirical perspective, there is some evidence that institutions trade 
against price deviations from fundamental values. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho 
(2002) find that institutional investors exploit individual investors' underreaction to 
cash flow news by purchasing shares with positive cash flow news and selling shares 
with negative cash flow news. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2004) report that institutions 
that trade actively exploit the post-earnings announcement drift. 
However, there is also some empirical support for the view that trades initiated 
by institutions push asset prices further away from fundamental values. Frazzini 
(2006) reports that the disposition effect, i.e., the tendency to realize capital gains but 
hold on to losses, of mutual fund managers intensifies the post-earning announcement 
drift. Extracting hedge fund holdings from 13f data, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) 
find that hedge fund rode the technology bubble and therefore destabilized prices of 
technology stocks. Shu (2006) constructs a measure of positive feed-back trading by 
institutional investors and finds stronger return momentum effects in stocks with 
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more institutional positive feed-back trading. Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2006) 
argue that trades by institutions that deviate from optimal trading can generate 
significant price anomalies. 
In a related study on mutual fund flows, Frazzini and Lamont (2006) report that, 
individual investors actively switch across mutual funds and their trend-chasing fund 
switching tends to drive fund flows into growth stocks and out of value stocks. To the 
extent that growth stocks tend to have positive realizations of past intangible 
information, whereas value stocks tend to experience negative realizations of past 
intangible information, their evidence is consistent with the findings reported here. 
My thesis differs in focusing on the net trade of aggregate institutional investors, 
instead of analyzing the component attributable to individual sentiment. 
Methodologically, my thesis uses holdings data to measure institutional trading 
directly, complementary to the inferences on institutional trading based on the 
covariance of portfolio returns, as in Frazzini and Lamont (2006). 
This thesis contributes to the empirical literature on institutional trading by 
showing that institutional investors can trade in a destabilizing way, intensifying 




INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND INTANGIBLE 
INFORMATION: AN ILLUSTRATION 
 
Before turning to more formal statistical analysis, this chapter presents an overview 
of the relation between institutional trading and intangible information. In what 
follows, I briefly introduce the construction of intangible returns, outline the data 
construction and summary statistics, and then illustrate the relation between 
institutional trading and intangible information. 
 
3.1 Construction of Intangible Returns 
Daniel and Titman (2006) construct the intangible return as the component of the past 
stock return that is not explained by accounting-based growth measures. Conceptually, 
the intangible return is a proxy for past realizations of information that is less 
concrete and orthogonal to information contained in the accounting-based growth 
measures we observe. In this thesis, I use the value of book equity as the principal 
measure of fundamental performance. The results hold if I include other fundamental 
measures, such as earnings, cash flow and sales in the calculation of intangible 
returns. 
Following Daniel and Titman, I decompose firms' stock price change between t-
τ and t into one component that reflects tangible information and the other that 
reflects intangible information. The proxies for tangible information at time t-τ and 
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tangible information that arrives between t-τ and t are the firms' τ-year lagged log 
book-to-market ratio and their τ-year book return respectively.10 Specifically, for each 
year I run a cross-sectional regression of each firm's past τ-year log stock return, ri(t-
τ,t), on the firms' τ-year lagged log book-to-market ratio, bmi,t-τ, and their τ-year book 
return, )( τ−tr Bi : 
 
   0 , ,( , ) . . ( , ) .
B
i BM i t B i i tr t t bm r t t uττ γ γ γ τ−− = + + − +       (1)                     
A firm's tangible return over this time period is defined as the fitted component of the 
regression  
        
   0 ,( , ) . . ( , ).
T B
i BM i t B ir t t bm r t tττ γ γ γ τ−− = + + −) ) )                 (2)   
                                                 
The intangible return is defined as the regression residual:11     
 
,( , ) .
I
i i tr t t uτ− =                                               (3) 
                                                 
10 As defined by Daniel and Titman (2006), the book return is conceptually similar to the stock return. 
It tells us that what the book value of our shares would be today if we had purchased $1 worth of book 
value of this stock τ years ago. The book return equals the change in the log book equity, plus a 
cumulative log share adjustment factor ).,()/log(),( ttnBBttr ttBi ττ τ −+=− − The cumulative 
log share adjustment factor, n(t-τ, t) is equal to the log number of shares one would have at time t, per 
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τ ,where fs is a price adjustment factor as defined 
similarly in CRSP. 
 
11 The average annual intangible return is not equal to zero, because I estimate intangible returns using 
the data from the intersection of CRSP and COMPUSTAT, before combining the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT data with the CDA/SPECTRUM database. The results are qualitatively similar when I 




3.2 Data Construction and Summary Statistics 
I construct the firm-level variables using the data from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
intersection linked to the CDA/SPECTRUM database of institutional holdings. To 
measure the dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts, I use the data taken from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The data requirements are similar to 
Daniel and Titman (2006). Specifically, I impose the requirement that a firm have a 
valid price on CRSP at the end of June of year t and as of December of years t-1, t-2 
and t-3, to be included in the firm-level panel. I also require that book value for the 
firm be available on COMPUSTAT for the firm's fiscal year ending in years t-1, t-2 
and t-3. I also require that the return on the firm over the period from December of 
year t-3 to December of year t-1 be available, since I use past one-year returns to 
estimate intangible returns. To alleviate concerns about bid-ask bounce and 
nontrading among very low price stocks, I also exclude all firms with prices that fall 
below five dollars per share as of the last trading day of June of year t. Finally, I 
exclude all firms with negative book values in any of the years from t-1 to t-3 and 
eliminate closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), American 
Depository Receipts (ADR), foreign companies, primes and scores. 
Consistent with the previous literature, I define a firm's log book-to-market ratio 
in year t as the log of the total book value of the firm at the end of the firms' fiscal 
year ending anywhere in year t-1 minus the log of the total market equity on the last 
trading day of calendar year t-1, as reported by CRSP. The book equity equals the 
shareholders' equity minus the preferred stock value. I use redemption value, 
liquidating value, or carrying value, in descending priority, to measure the preferred 
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stock value. If all of the redemption, liquidating, or par value are missing from 
COMPUSTAT, then I consider the observation as missing for that year. Finally, if 
balance sheet deferred taxes and the FASB 106 adjustment are not missing, I add in 
balance sheet deferred taxes to this book-equity value, and subtract off the FASB106 
adjustment. 
 Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample, which consists of 
49,164 firm-years and spans the period 1981-2004. Panel A reports the basic statistics. 
The average annual log stock return in the sample is 9.7 percent. By construction, the 
average annual intangible return is only -2.3%. For a typical firm, 36 per cent of the 
shares outstanding are held by institutional investors and on average 80 institutions 
are holding the shares of the firm. Panel B reports contemporaneous correlations 
between the variables of interest. It reveals that both the level of institutional 
ownership and the number of institutions holding the stock is positively correlated 
with intangible returns. In Panel C, I report first-order cross-correlations and 
autocorrelations of the variables. Interestingly, both institutional ownership and the 
number of institutions are positively correlated with lagged intangible returns. 
 
3.3 Institutional Trading and Intangible Information: an Illustration 
In this section, I use an ad hoc event-study approach to illustrate the relation between 
institutional trading and intangible information. Specifically, at the end of each June 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports means, standard deviations and percentiles of log returns; intangible returns; book 
returns; the fraction of shares owned by 13f institutions (IO); and the number of 13f institutions 
holding a stock (N_INST). Intangible returns are the residuals of regressions of past 1-year returns 
on lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns, defined as in Daniel and Titman (2006). Book 
returns are defined as log book value change plus a cumulative log share adjustment factor. Panel 
B reports the contemporaneous correlations and Panel C the first-order cross- and autocorrelations 
of market-adjusted (i.e., cross-sectionally demeaned) variables. The annual data set consists of 
49,164 firm-years and spans the period 1981-2004. The descriptive statistics are estimated from 
pooled data. 
 
Panel A Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 MEAN STD MIN P10 P25 MEDIAN P75 P90 MAX 
Return 0.097  0.382  -2.319 -0.353 -0.116 0.102  0.310  0.534  3.147 
Intangible -0.023  0.350  -2.499 -0.427 -0.219 -0.025  0.169  0.375  2.910 
Book return 0.109  0.270  -6.593 -0.080 0.040  0.109  0.174  0.294  6.523 
IO 0.359  0.258  0.000  0.000  0.132  0.343  0.564  0.720  0.999 
N_INST 80.1  119.6  0 0 10 36 101 207 1379 
 
Panel B Contemporaneous Correlations, Market-adjusted Data 
 Return Intangible Book return IO N_INST 
Return 1.000      
Intangible 0.461  1.000     
Book return 0.034  0.025  1.000    
IO -0.059  0.014  0.023  1.000  
N_INST -0.025  0.053  0.031  0.434 1.000  
 
Panel C First-order Cross and Autocorrelations 
 Return(t) Intangible(t) Book return(t) IO(t) N_INST(t)
Return(t-1) -0.031  0.461  0.247  0.046  0.041  
Intangible(t-1) -0.103  -0.011  0.286  0.092  0.115  
Book return(t-1) -0.064  -0.038  -0.021  0.030  0.040  
IO(t-1) -0.034  -0.015  -0.011  0.930  0.429  




between 1985 and 2004, I form 10-decile portfolios based on past 5-year intangible 
returns (intangible returns from December t-6 to December t-1). Decile 1 is the 
portfolio of stocks with lowest intangible returns; Decile 5 is the portfolio with 
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median intangible returns; and Decile 10 is the portfolio with highest intangible 
returns. I then investigate the performance of these portfolios during the 5-year 
ranking period and the 1-year post-ranking period. To examine the trading activities 
of institutional investors, I compute average institutional ownership for these 
portfolios over the ranking and holding periods. The choice of 5-year ranking period 
is consistent with most of the literature on long-term return reversals. In subsequent 
VAR analysis, I report the results based on 1-year intangible returns.12 Since the 
aggregate institutional ownership is not stable over the sample period (see. e.g., 
Gompers and Metrick, 2001), I cross-sectionally de-mean firm-level stock returns and 
institutional ownership before computing portfolio-level returns and institutional 
ownership. 
 Figure 3.1 presents the results. The top panel plots equal-weighted, market-
adjusted (i.e., cross-sectionally demeaned) quarterly returns on Decile-1, Decile-5 and 
Decile-10 portfolios from 21 quarters before portfolio formation to 4 quarters after 
portfolio formation. The results clearly show the strong reversal of past intangible 
returns. Stocks in the highest past 5-year intangible return decile perform extremely 
well in the past. The market-adjusted quarterly returns fluctuate between 5 percent 
and 15 percent. About two quarters before portfolio formation, the performance of 
high intangible return portfolios starts to deteriorate, underperforming the market. 
This underperformance of high intangible return portfolios continues during the 4 
quarters after portfolio formation. A similar pattern of reversal is obvious for the 
                                                 
12 I redo the event-study analysis using past 1-year intangible returns. The results reveal a similar 
relation between institutional trading and intangible information. 
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stocks in the lowest past 5-yer intangible return decile. The results are consistent with 
the findings reported in Daniel and Titman (2006). 
The bottom panel plots equal-weighted, market-adjusted institutional ownership 
on these portfolios from 21 quarters before portfolio formation to 4 quarters after 
portfolio formation. The results suggest a strong response of institutional ownership 
to intangible information. For stocks with highest past 5-year intangible returns, the 
market-adjusted institutional ownership increased from below -2% to above 2% 
during the 5-year ranking period. For stocks experiencing lowest past 5-year 
intangible returns, the market-adjusted institutional ownership decreased from around 
zero to -6% over the 5-year ranking window. 
         The results reveal interesting correlation between institutional trading and 
intangible information, suggesting that institutions buy shares in response to positive 
intangible information and sell shares in response to negative intangible information. 
However, there are alternative interpretations of the results. For example, one might 
argue that institutions could simply trade on past stock returns, instead of 
discriminating between tangible and intangible information. It is also possible that the 
intangible component of stock returns simply reflects the trading impact of 
institutions, instead of capturing intangible information. In the next chapter, I more 
formally analyze how institutions trade in response to intangible information and 
present evidence that refutes these alternative interpretations. 
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Figure 3.1: Market-adjusted Quarterly Returns and Institutional Ownership for 
Portfolios Based on Past Intangible Returns. At the end of each June between 1985 and 
2004, 10-decile portfolios are formed based on past five-year intangible returns, which are 
residuals of the regressions of past five-year returns on lagged book-to-market ratio and book 
returns, defined as in Daniel and Titman (2006). Book returns are defined as log book value 
change plus a cumulative log share adjustment factor. Decile 1 is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lowest intangible returns; decile 5 is with the medium intangible returns; and decile 10 the highest 
intangible returns. The top panel plots equal-weighted, market-adjusted (i.e., cross-sectionally 
demeaned) quarterly returns on the portfolios from 21 quarters before portfolio formation to 4 
quarters after portfolio formation. The bottom panel plots equal-weighted, market-adjusted (i.e., 
cross-sectionally demeaned) institutional ownership on the portfolios from 21 quarters before 




INSTITUTIONAL TRADING AND INTANGIBLE 
INFORMATION: A VAR MODEL 
 
This thesis investigates the joint dynamics of institutional trading, intangible 
information and stock returns using a firm-level VAR model. The approach I take in 
this study is to view the stock market as consisting of an aggregate institution trading 
with the rest of the market, or an aggregate individual, and then infer the trading 
impact of institutions as a group. By so doing, I abstract from trading among 
institutions, trading among individuals and trades that take place between institutions 
and individuals at higher frequency, but not identifiable quarterly or annually. Since 
all of these trading activities can have important impact on stock prices, the results in 
this thesis are best viewed as identifying one important force that constitutes market 
reaction to intangible information. 
 Specifically, I empirically examine the response of institutional ownership to 
intangible information, following a two-step procedure. In the first step, I follow the 
return decomposition scheme in Daniel and Titman (2006) and use the intangible 
return as a proxy for realizations of past intangible information.13 The tradeoff here is 
that estimating intangible returns requires a low-frequency analysis, whereas 
measuring institutional response, specifically estimating the VAR model demands 
                                                 
13 Using another proxy for intangible information, the composite equity issuance measure, as proposed 
by Daniel and Titman (2006), I obtain qualitatively similar results. 
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intangible returns measured at relatively higher frequency. I choose 1-year intangible 
returns in estimating the VAR model as a result of this tradeoff. 
In the second step, I estimate a parsimonious trivariate VAR specification that 
uses annual market-adjusted log stock returns, ri,t, 1-year intangible returns, ,Iir  as 
calculated in Equation 3, and the fraction of institutional ownership, IOi,t.14 Only one 
lag of each is used to predict the state-vector evolution.15 
 
























In what follows, I relate intangible returns to measures of value ambiguity. The 
second section presents the empirical results of VAR analysis. 
 
4.1 Deciphering Intangible Returns 
                                                 
14 The VAR model has the advantage of measuring institutional ownership response to intangible 
information, taking into account potential feedback effects among the state variables. In the economy 
represented by the VAR model, an aggregate institution is trading in response to tangible and 
intangible information, which is a broad classification of information that moves stock prices. The 
VAR model consists of stock returns (instead of tangible returns), intangible returns and institutional 
ownership, because stock returns can be conveniently expressed as the sum of tangible returns and 
intangible returns, and the model is equivalent to a model consisting of tangible returns, intangible 
returns and institutional ownership. I choose the model specification of stock returns, intangible returns 
and institutional ownership because it captures institutional response to intangible information and 
retains the effect of past intangible returns on current stock returns, so that I can investigate the return 
predictability. 
 
15 The choice of VAR(1) specification reflects the concern that my sample spans a relatively short time 
interval: 1981-2004. Moreover, when I include further lags in the regressions, the coefficients for the 
further lags are mostly insignificant. 
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Daniel and Titman construct the measure of intangible returns to capture realizations 
of information that is vague or ambiguous, difficult for investors to interpret. In this 
section, I examine the industry distribution of stocks with extreme intangible returns 
and relate intangible returns to other variables associated with value ambiguity to 
shed some light on the nature of intangible returns. 
 Based on the 49-industry classification of Fama and French (1997), I analyze 
which industries are most likely to have extreme intangible returns and which 
industries are most likely to have intangible returns close to zero. Specifically, each 
year, I rank stocks into ten groups based on the absolute value of past 1-year 
intangible returns and calculate the average rank value for each industry. Based on the 
time-series average of the rank values for each industry, I find that the Computer 
Software Industry, Computer Hardware Industry and Pharmaceutical Products 
Industry are most likely to experience extreme intangible returns, whereas the 
Utilities Industry, Banking Industry and Trading Industry are most likely to 
experience intangible returns close to zero.16 In short, intangible information is most 
likely to arrive for technology-oriented firms. The results are consistent with the 
conjecture of Daniel and Titman (2006) that intangible information is related to firms' 
growth option, whereas tangible information is related to firms' assets in place. 
 Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of stocks experiencing negative and 
positive realizations of intangible information. The characteristics include R&D 
expenditures (capturing asset intangibility), trading volume, return volatility and 
dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts (capturing dispersion of beliefs among 
                                                 
16 I keep firms in the banking and trading industries to make the sample consistent with Daniel and 
Titman (2006). The results are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion firms in the financial services 
industries. See the Appendix for detailed industry definitions. 
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investors). I deflate R&D expenditures by both past-year sales and current sales. 
Since the results are qualitatively similar, I only report the results using past-year 
sales. Turnover is defined as the average trading volume in the past 12 months 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. Volatility is the standard deviation of 
returns in the past 12 months. To measure dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts, I 
use the average ratio of the standard deviation of the analysts' current-fiscal-year 
annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the mean forecast in the 
past 12 months. Both the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts and the 
mean analyst earnings forecast are taken from the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary 
History file.17 
 The results reveal an interesting U-shape relation between intangible returns and 
these characteristics. Stocks with extreme intangible returns tend to have higher R&D 
expenditures, higher trading volume, more volatile returns, and higher dispersion in 
analyst earnings forecasts than stocks with intangible returns close to zero. In terms of 
R&D expenditures, firms in the highest-intangible-return quintile on average invest 
their sales fully in R&D, and firms in the lowest-intangible-return quintile on average 
invest 68% of sales in R&D. In contrast, firms with intangible returns close to zero on 
average invest only 53% of their sales in R&D. A similar U-shape pattern is apparent 
for trading volume, return volatility and dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts. The 
results are consistent with the interpretation that intangible returns capture 
                                                 
17 Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) report the following inaccuracy in I/B/E/S Adjusted History 
files: "I/B/E/S analysts' forecasts are adjusted historically for stock splits in order to produce a smooth 
time series of earnings per share estimates. ... However, after dividing historical analysts' forecasts by a 
split adjustment factor, I/B/E/S rounds the estimates to the nearest cent. For example, for a stock that 
has split 10-fold, actual earnings per share estimates of 10 cents and 14 cents would be reported as 1 
cent per share each. ... The observed analysts' forecasts would then be zero, when in fact it is positive." 
To avoid such a bias, I use the data from the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary History file. 
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realizations of information that is vague or ambiguous and induces high dispersion of 
beliefs among investors. The results are inconsistent with the interpretation of Figure 
3.1 that intangible returns simply reflect the trading impact of institutions, instead of 
capturing underlying uncertainties. 
 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of Portfolios Based on Past Intangible Return 
At the end of each June between 1981 and 2004, 5-quintile portfolios are formed based on past 1-
year intangible returns, which are residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged 
book-to-market ratio and book returns. Only firms with R&D expenditures are included in the 
calculation of mean R&D to sales ratio. Turnover is defined as the average trading volume in the 
past 12 months divided by the number of shares outstanding. Volatility is the standard deviation of 
returns in the past 12 months. Forecast Dispersion is defined as the average ratio of the standard 
deviation of the analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute 
value of the mean forecast in the past 12 months.  
 
  Means   Standard Deviations 
Intangible 
Return R&D/Sales Turnover* Volatility
Forecast 
Dispersion R&D/Sales Turnover Volatility 
Forecast 
Dispersion
Low 0.682 1.232 0.124 0.289 1.073 0.553 0.028 0.111 
P2 0.672 0.776 0.096 0.173 1.465 0.249 0.018 0.071 
P3 0.530 0.755 0.091 0.118 0.820 0.245 0.015 0.039 
P4 0.319 0.859 0.099 0.122 0.415 0.304 0.019 0.040 
High 1.057 1.411 0.141 0.167 1.300 0.631 0.032 0.064 
* Partitioning firms into NASDAQ and NYSE groups generates a similar U-shape relation between 




4.2 Empirical Results 
I use the weighted least squares (WLS) approach in estimating the VAR parameters 
(the results are not sensitive to the choice of WLS or OLS). In the spirit of Fama-
MacBeth (1973) procedure and following Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen, Gompers 
and Vuolteenaho (2002), I weight each cross-section equally, deflating the data for 
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each firm-year by the number of firms in the corresponding cross-section.18  For 
financial panel data set which consists of large cross-sections (typically thousands of 
stocks in one cross-section) but relatively short time series (24 years in this study), 
Fama and French (2000) show that incorrectly assuming that the errors are cross-
sectionally uncorrelated can introduce substantial downward biases (see, Petersen 
2006, for an excellent discussion of calculating standard errors for financial panel 
data). To calculate the cross-correlation-consistent standard errors, I use both the 
clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1983 and 1993) and the jackknife method (Shao 
and Rao, 1993). 
Table 4.2 reports the VAR parameter estimates. Since stock returns are the sum 
of tangible returns and intangible returns, the true coefficients for intangible returns 
in each prediction regression are the sum of the coefficients for stock returns and 
intangible returns. The first row shows the results for the return prediction equation. 
The results indicate that past intangible returns strongly and negatively predict future 
stock returns, whereas stock returns do not show significant return prediction power 
in the presence of intangible returns. The results are consistent with the finding of 
Daniel and Titman (2006) that past stock returns (and the book-to-market ratio) 
predict future returns because they proxy for intangible returns. Interestingly, 
institutional ownership is significantly and negatively correlated with future returns, 
controlling for both tangible and intangible returns. 
                                                 
18 In Fama and MacBeth (1973), each cross-section is assumed a random draw from the population. In 
pooled regression, however, the cross-section with more observations is overweighted compared to 
Fama-MacBeth procedure. By deflating each cross-section with the number of observations, each 
cross-section is equally weighted. 
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The third row reports the results for institutional ownership prediction equation. 
The results show that institutional ownership increases (decreases) following positive 
(negative) intangible information. The result that intangible returns positively predict 
future institutional ownership in the presence of stock returns rejects the hypothesis 
that institutions are simply trading on past stock returns, without discriminating 
between tangible and intangible information. 
 Figure 4.1 shows the dynamics of the VAR implied by Table 4.2. To calculate 
the impulse response functions of the trivariate VAR, I orthogonalize the VAR errors 
so that intangible returns do not respond contemporaneously to a stock returns 
shock.19 This orthogonalization is equivalent to including current intangible returns in 
the stock returns regression. Therefore, the interpretation of a stock returns shock is a 
tangible returns shock. The error bands (5th and 95th percentiles) for impulse 
responses are calculated from 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. The top two graphs 
show the responses of stock returns to a 25% intangible returns shock and a 25% 
tangible returns shock. The results reveal that the impact of a intangible returns shock 
on stock returns reverses subsequently, suggesting market overreaction to intangible 
information. Instead, there is no tendency for the effect of a tangible returns shock on 
stock returns to reverse subsequently. The results are consistent with the 
interpretation that the stock market reacts to tangible information in an efficient way. 
 
                                                 
19 To calculate the impulse response functions, I reorder the VAR system as intangible returns, stock 
returns, and institutional ownership. 
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Table 4.2 Firm-level VAR Model Parameter Estimates: Institutional Ownership 
The table reports the VAR parameter estimates from the annual panel ranging 1981 to 2004. The 
model state variables include the market-adjusted log stock returns, market-adjusted intangible 
returns, and market-adjusted institutional ownership. Intangible returns are residuals of the 
regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns. I report both 
the clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1983 and 1993) and robust jackknife standard errors (Shao 
and Rao, 1993). Since stock returns are the sum of tangible returns and intangible returns, the true 
coefficients for intangible returns in the regressions are the sum of the coefficients for stock 
returns and intangible returns in each equation. 
 







Return 0.0585  0.0205  -0.1147  -0.0603  
Clustered S.E. 0.0105  0.0482  0.0301  0.0232  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0111  0.0467  0.0293  0.0221  
Intangible return -0.0550  0.5916  -0.2793  0.0204  
Clustered S.E. 0.0044  0.0373  0.0357  0.0178  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0046  0.0336  0.0328  0.0163  
Institutional Ownership 0.0065  0.0579  0.0285  0.9390  
Clustered S.E. 0.0026  0.0055  0.0034  0.0064  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0026  0.0050  0.0032  0.0064  
 
The bottom two graphs show the responses of institutional ownership to a 25% 
intangible returns shock and a 25% tangible returns shock. The results show that 
institutional ownership responds positively to intangible information. The cumulative 
response of institutional ownership to a 25% intangible return shock on average is 
16% after 20 years. The results also show that the response of institutional ownership 
to a positive tangible returns shock is positive and strong, which is consistent the 
literature showing that institutional trading facilitates incorporation of information 
into stock prices (see, e.g., Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, Starks and Titman, 2006). 
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative Response of Stock Returns and Institutional Ownership 
to Shocks. The impulse-response functions are computed from the VAR system of Table 4.2. 
The top two graphs show the cumulative response of stock returns to 25% intangible returns 
shock and 25% tangible returns shock. The bottom two graphs show the cumulative response of 
institutional ownership to 25% intangible returns shock and 25% tangible returns shock. The error 




I conclude from these results that institutional investors tend to buy shares in 
response to positive intangible information and sell shares in response to negative 
intangible information. The results, in conjunction with the Daniel and Titman (2006) 
results that the market overreacts to intangible information, are consistent with the 
interpretation that institutional trading tends to exacerbate market overreaction to 
intangible information, while inconsistent with the efficient markets view that 
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institutional investors trade against mispricings and bring stock prices towards 
fundamental values.  
In a related study, Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) decompose stock 
returns into shocks to cash flows and shocks to expected returns in line with 
Campbell (1991). They report that institutions buy (sell) shares in response to positive 
(negative) cash flow news, thus exploiting individuals’ underreaction to cash flow 
news. As noted by Daniel and Titman, tangible returns are likely to be related to cash 
flow news, whereas intangible returns may be related to discount rate news. My 
results show that institutions buy (sell) stocks in response to positive (negative) 
tangible information. As tangible returns have no relation to future returns, my results 
suggest that the trading activities of institutions facilitate incorporation of tangible 
information into stock prices, and are therefore consistent with the finding of Cohen, 
Gompers and Vuolteenaho. However, my results also show that institutions buy (sell) 
stocks in response to positive (negative) intangible information. In contrast, the 
results of Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenhao imply that institutions sell (buy) stocks 
in response to positive (negative) discount rate information. This difference suggests 
that there might be some systematic difference between the Campbell (1991) return 
decomposition and Daniel and Titman (2006) return decomposition. It would be 
interesting to further explore the link and difference between the two return 




INSTITUTIONAL HERDING AND INTANGIBLE 
INFORMATION 
 
In the preceding analysis, I view the stock market as consisting of an aggregate 
institutional investor trading with an aggregate individual investor. The results 
establish that as a group, institutional investors buy shares in response to positive 
intangible information and sell shares in response to negative intangible information. 
Why do institutions as a group trade in this way? The theoretical models of agency-
based herding provide a potential explanation. 
Suppose that rational investment managers understand that stock prices have 
overreacted to intangible information. However, they invest on the behalf of their 
clients and, therefore, care about their reputation in the labor markets in addition to 
the investment outcome. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), among others, show that 
investment managers with reputational concerns can under some circumstances 
discard their own judgments (e.g., the belief that stock price has overreacted to 
intangible information) and mimic the behavior of others, exhibiting herding behavior. 
They also find that, due to the "sharing-the-blame" effect, this tendency for 
investment managers to herd is stronger when there are more uncertainties about the 
investment outcome. Based on their model, it stands to reason that the arrival of 
intangible information may induce institutional managers to trade in herds, 
exacerbating market overreaction to intangible information: since intangible 
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information is associated with more underlying uncertainties (as shown in Table 4.1), 
trading against intangible information might be more difficult for managers to justify 
to their clients. 
To test for this prediction, I examine stock holdings at the level of individual 
investment managers and investigate the relation between institutional herding and 
intangible information in two ways. I first use the herding measure developed by 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) to investigate the cross-sectional dispersion 
in institutional herding on stocks with different realizations of intangible information. 
The herding measure is described as 
 
        , , , , ,| [ ] | | [ ] |,i t i t i t i t i tHM p E p E p E p= − − −          (5) 
where ,i tp equals the proportion of institutions, trading in stock i during year t, that are 
buyers; ,[ ]i tE p is the expected proportion of institutions buying in year t relative to the 
total number of active institutions. As a proxy for ,[ ]i tE p , I use the proportion of all 
stock trades by institutions in year t that are buys, for the average stock, i.e., the mean 
of ,i tp over all stocks during year t. The adjustment factor, , ,| [ ] |i t i tE p E p− , is then 
subtracted to address the concern that for stocks that are not traded by a large number 
of institutions, , ,| [ ] |i t i tE p E p− is greater than zero under the null hypothesis of no 
herding, i.e., each institution trades independently. , ,| [ ] |i t i tE p E p−  is decreasing in the 
number of institutions trading in the stock.  
Following Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999), I use 
the conditional variants of ,i tHM  to allow for heterogeneity of institutional herding on 
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the buy side versus on the sell side. The conditional herding measures, 
,i tBHM and ,i tSHM , are specified as follows: 
 
, , , ,| [ ],i t i t i t i tBHM HM p E p>=                (6) 
, , , ,| [ ].i t i t i t i tSHM HM p E p<=                (7) 
 
This partition of stock-years into buy herding, i.e., , ,[ ]i t i tp E p> and sell herding, i.e., 
, ,[ ]i t i tp E p<  is useful in analyzing herding by institutions into stocks separately from 
herding out of stocks. Since preceding analysis shows that, institutions as a group buy 
(sell) shares in response to positive (negative) intangible information, I expect that 
positive (negative) intangible information induces strong institutional herding on the 
buy (sell) side.  
Table 5.1 presents the results. To be included in the analysis, I require each 
stock has at least two institutions trading in that year. Since the distribution of the 
herding measure is skewed to the right (consistent with the finding on mutual fund 
herding by Wermers, 1999), I report both medians and means of HMi,t. Overall, I find 
slightly stronger tendency of institutions to herd than previous studies on mutual 
funds and pension funds. The median (mean) HM for all stock-years in my sample is 
4.56 (7.7) percent.20 Due to the large sample size, it is strongly significant: the Z-
statistic of signrank test under the null hypothesis that the median equals zero is 131. 
                                                 
20 Using a sample of pension funds in the period 1985 to 1989, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
reports a mean herding measure of 2.7%. Wermers (1999) finds that the mean herding measure is 3.4% 
for his sample of mutual funds during the period 1975 to 1994. 
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The focus of my investigation is, however, on the cross-sectional dispersion in 
institutional herding on stocks with different realizations of intangible information. 
Panel A presents the average levels of institutional herding for five groups of stocks  
Table 5.1 Institutional Herding on Stocks Experiencing Intangible 
Information 
At the end of each June between 1981 and 2004, 5-quintile portfolios are formed based on past 1-
year intangible returns, which are residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged 
book-to-market ratio and book returns. The herding measure, ,i tHM , for a given stock-year equals  
, , , ,| [ ] | | [ ] |i t i t i t i tp E p E p E p− − − , where ,i tp equals the proportion of institutions trading stock i 
during year t that are buyers. The proxy used for ,[ ] |i tE p is the proportion of all stock trades by 
institutional investment managers during year t that are buys. , ,| [ ] |i t i tE p E p− is calculated under 
the null hypothesis that institutional managers trade independently. The conditional herding 
measures, ,i tBHM and ,i tSHM for a given stock-year equal , , ,| [ ]i t i t i tHM p E p> and 
, , ,| [ ]i t i t i tHM p E p< respectively. Membership of a stock-year requires that at least 2 institutions 
traded the stock in the particular year.  
 
Intangible Return 
  Low P2 P3 P4 High 
Panel A: Unconditional Herding Measure HM 
Median 0.0447 0.0378 0.0394 0.0459 0.0653 
signrank Z-stat 58 54 56 60 65 
Mean 0.077 0.0716 0.073 0.0801 0.0946 
T-stat 64 60 61 67 76 
# of stock-years 12220 12280 12323 12290 12025 
Panel B: Herding Measure Conditional on Buying BHM 
Median 0.0523 0.0508 0.0578 0.0676 0.0924 
signrank Z-stat 44 43 48 53 62 
Mean 0.0833 0.0807 0.0858 0.0923 0.1069 
T-stat 52 52 57 65 80 
# of stock-years 6101 6288 6671 7133 8113 
Panel C: Herding Measure Conditional on Selling SHM 
Median 0.0384 0.0302 0.0264 0.0261 0.0245 
signrank Z-stat 37 33 30 30 23 
Mean 0.0708 0.062 0.0579 0.0632 0.0689 
T-stat 40 34 31 31 27 
# of stock-years 6119 5992 5652 5157 3912 
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based on past intangible returns. The results show that stocks with highest past 
intangible returns exhibit the strongest tendency of herding by institutions. They also 
indicate that stocks with lowest intangible returns have strong tendency of herding by 
institutions. In contrast, the tendency of institutions to herd on stocks with median 
intangible returns is relatively weak. The results are consistent with the conjecture 
that the arrival of intangible information triggers herding among institutions. But the 
results have nothing to say about whether herding by institutions is on the buy side or 
on the sell side. 
Panels B and C report the average levels of herding by institutions, conditional 
on whether the set of institutions is buying or selling the stock during the year to a 
greater degree than would be expected with random buying and selling, for five 
groups of stocks based on past intangible returns. Two images emerge from the 
results. First, institutions tend to buy stocks in herds more frequently than they sell in 
herds. For each group of stocks, the median and mean of BHM are substantially 
greater than those of SHM. Secondly, the tendency of institutions to buy stocks in 
herds is increasing in past intangible returns, whereas the tendency of institutions to 
sell in herds is decreasing in past intangible returns. The results are consistent with 
the interpretation that positive (negative) intangible information tends to trigger 
institutional herding on the buy (sell) side. 
As a second way to relate institutional herding to intangible information, I 
repeat the preceding VAR analysis, replacing institutional ownership with the number 
of institutions holding a stock. The VAR parameter estimates and the dynamics 
implied by the VAR system are reported in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1. The results 
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reveal that positive (negative) intangible information induces position initiations 
(eliminations) among professional managers in the subsequent periods. To the extent 
that the time-series variation in the number of institutions holding a stock is related to 
institutional herding, the results reinforce the argument that herding by institutions is 
an important force driving the institutional response to intangible information. 
 
Table 5.2 Firm-level VAR Model Parameter Estimates: Number of Institutions 
The table reports the VAR parameter estimates from the annual panel ranging 1981 to 2004. The 
model state variables include the market-adjusted log stock returns, market-adjusted intangible 
returns, and market-adjusted number of institutions. Intangible returns are residuals of the 
regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns. I report both 
the clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1983 and 1993) and robust jackknife standard errors (Shao 
and Rao, 1993). Since stock returns are the sum of tangible returns and intangible returns, the true 
coefficients for intangible returns in the regressions are the sum of the coefficients for stock 
returns and intangible returns in each equation. 
 






Return 0.0577  0.0229  -0.1146  0.0000  
Clustered S.E. 0.0105  0.0482  0.0297  0.0001  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0110  0.0467  0.0291  0.0001  
Intangible return -0.0562  0.5943  -0.2819  0.0002  
Clustered S.E. 0.0046  0.0361  0.0357  0.0001  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0045  0.0313  0.0316  0.0001  
N_INST 1.0594  20.1040 11.1992 1.0366  
Clustered S.E. 1.0528  1.6249  0.9968  0.0097  
Jackknife S.E. 1.0428  1.8107  0.9738  0.0089  
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative Response of Stock Returns and Number of Institutions 
to Shocks. The impulse-response functions are computed from the VAR system of Table 5.2. 
The top two graphs show the cumulative response of stock returns to a 25% intangible returns 
shock and a 25% tangible returns shock. The bottom two graphs show the cumulative response of 
the number of institutions holding a stock to a 25% intangible returns shock and a 25% tangible 
returns shock. The error bands for impulse responses (5th and 95th percentiles) are calculated from 
10,000 Monte Carlo Simulations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DOES INSTITUTIONAL TRADING (HERDING) 
MAGNIFY MISPRICINGS? 
 
The preceding analyses reveal that institutional investors tend to buy shares in herds 
in response to positive intangible information and sell shares in herds in response to 
negative intangible information. The results suggest that the trading activities of 
institutions exacerbate market overreaction to intangible information and destabilize 
asset prices. In this chapter, I investigate the trading impact of institutions on asset 
prices and provide direct evidence on the link between institutional trading and 
market overreaction to intangible information. 
 
6.1 Results 
To examine the interaction effects between institutional trading and market 
overreaction to intangible information, at the end of each June between 1981 and 
2004, I sort stocks into 5 portfolios based on the LSV institutional herding measure 
(HM) in the past one year.21 At the same time, I form 5 portfolios on the basis of past 
1-year intangible returns. 25 portfolios are then constructed from the intersection of 
the portfolios independently sorted on institutional herding and past intangible returns. 
                                                 
21 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the rank of LSV unconditional herding measures and 
size (market value of equity) is only 5%. Therefore, the interaction effect between institutional herding 
and intangible returns is unlikely to be driven by the interaction effect between size and intangible 
returns, as reported in Daniel and Titman (2006). 
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Panel A of Table 6.1 reports time-series averages of equal-weighted monthly 
percentage returns on the 25 portfolios.22 
The results show that conditional on the level of institutional herding, low 
intangible-return stocks significantly outperform high intangible-return stocks, 
consistent with the Fama-MacBeth regression results of Daniel and Titman (2006). 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the return differential between low and high 
intangible-return stocks is increasing in the level of institutional herding. For stocks 
with high level of institutional herding, the average annual return differential between 
low and high intangible-return stocks is 11.1%. For stocks with low level of 
institutional herding, the average annual return differential is only 5.2%. If we 
interpret the return differential between low and high intangible-return stocks as 
reflecting market overreaction to intangible information, the evidence is consistent 
with the view that institutional trading exacerbates market overreaction to intangible 
information, magnifying the mispricings.   
Alternatively, we may explain the higher return on low intangible-return stocks 
as compensation for higher risk of low intangible-return stocks. If stocks with low 
intangible returns are riskier, the above results may simply mean that institutions are 
more likely to trade in herds stocks with wider dispersion in risk. To examine this 
risk-based explanation, I construct five zero-cost portfolios buying stocks with low 
intangible returns and selling short stocks with high intangible returns conditional on  
 
                                                 
22 The results based on value-weighted portfolio returns also indicate that, conditional on the level of 
institutional herding, low intangible-return stocks earn higher returns than high intangible-return stocks, 
and the return differential is increasing in the level of institutional herding. However, the value-
weighted return differential is not statistically significant. 
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Table 6.1 Average Monthly Returns in Percent on Portfolios Independently 
Sorted on Past Intangible (Tangible) Returns and Institutional Herding 
At the end of each June between 1981 and 2004, stocks are sorted into 5 portfolios based on LSV 
institutional herding measures (HM) in the past one year. At the same time, 5 portfolios are 
formed on the basis of past 1-year intangible (tangible) returns. Past 1-year intangible returns are 
residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns. 
Past 1-year tangible returns are the fitted values of the regressions. 25 portfolios are then formed 
from the intersection of the portfolios independently sorted on institutional herding and past 
intangible (tangible) returns. Panel A reports time-series averages of equal-weighted monthly 
returns in percent on the 25 portfolios independently sorted on past intangible returns and 
institutional herding. Panel B reports time-series averages of equal-weighted monthly returns in 
percent on the 25 portfolios independently sorted on past tangible returns and institutional herding. 
T-statistics are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. The numbers in boldface are 
significant at the 1% level. Otherwise, the numbers are insignificant.  
 
Panel A Average Returns on the 25 Portfolios Independently Sorted on Past Intangible 
Returns and Institutional Herding 
 
 
Past Intangible Returns  
Low 2 3 4 High Low-High 
Low HM 1.78 1.55 1.53 1.53 1.35 0.44 
 [6.00] [6.33] [6.62] [5.87] [4.20] [2.75] 
2 1.72 1.45 1.36 1.41 1.21 0.52 
 [5.15] [5.25] [5.42] [5.20] [3.54] [2.73] 
3 1.68 1.57 1.42 1.35 1.09 0.59 
 [5.04] [5.74] [5.55] [5.05] [3.20] [2.98] 
4 1.90 1.57 1.32 1.44 1.24 0.66 
 [5.68] [5.80] [5.28] [5.26] [3.31] [3.09] 
High HM 2.13 1.59 1.41 1.36 1.21 0.92 
 [6.34] [6.03] [5.48] [5.00] [3.15] [3.74] 
Low-High -0.35 -0.04 0.11 0.17 0.14  
 [-2.49] [-0.34] [0.93] [1.47] [0.71]  
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Panel B Average Returns on the 25 Portfolios Independently Sorted on Past Tangible 
Returns and Institutional Herding 
 
 
Past Tangible Returns  
Low 2 3 4 High Low-High 
Low HM 1.83 1.37 1.41 1.62 1.59 0.24 
 [5.14] [4.96] [5.59] [6.66] [5.93] [1.14] 
2 1.51 1.33 1.36 1.43 1.57 -0.06 
 [4.40] [4.56] [5.06] [5.49] [5.46] [-0.33] 
3 1.52 1.39 1.34 1.32 1.53 -0.01 
 [4.50] [4.81] [4.92] [5.33] [5.07] [-0.04] 
4 1.62 1.34 1.40 1.63 1.39 0.23 
 [4.67] [4.35] [5.14] [6.11] [4.46] [1.26] 
High HM 1.59 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.38 0.22 
 [4.38] [5.03] [5.42] [5.50] [4.26] [1.07] 
Low-High 0.24 -0.12 -0.09 0.13 0.21  
 [1.37] [-0.96] [-0.72] [0.99] [1.32]  
 
the level of institutional herding. I then calculate risk-adjusted returns on these five 
long/short portfolios relative to standard asset pricing models. If the return differential 
between low and high intangible-return stocks can be explained by different riskiness 
of these two groups of stocks as captured by the asset pricing models, we would 
expect the risk-adjusted returns on the long/short portfolios to be zero. The specific 
asset pricing models I use in this study are CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model and 
Carhart 4-factor model.23   
Table 6.2 presents the results. The CAPM does not help to explain the return 
differential between low and high intangible-return stocks. For all the five arbitrage 
portfolios, the CAPM alphas are statistically and economically significant. Since 
these five portfolios have negative loadings on the market factor, the risk-adjusted 
                                                 
23 I also use a 5-factor model that includes Fama-French three factors, Carhart momentum factor and 
Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to calculate risk-adjusted returns. Since all the five arbitrage 
portfolios have no significant loadings on the liquidity factor, the results are similar to Carhart 4-factor 
model. 
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returns are even higher than raw returns. The monotone increasing relation between 
the spread in returns and the level of institutional herding remains for CAPM alphas. 
The Fama-French 3-factor model helps to explain the cross-sectional dispersion 
in returns to portfolios sorted on past intangible returns. For stocks with low and 
median levels of institutional herding (Quintiles 1 to 4), the returns on the arbitrage 
portfolios can largely be explained by the portfolios' positive loadings on the SMB 
and HML factors. This result is not surprising because the Fama-French 3-factor 
model was designed to explain the book-to-market effect, and, therefore, the 
intangible returns effect. However, for stocks with high level of institutional herding, 
the Fama-French 3-factor model fails to explain the return differential between low 
and high intangible-return stocks. The 3-factor alpha on this portfolio is 6.2% per 
year and statistically significant. Interestingly, the magnitudes of Fama-French 3-
factor alphas continue to be increasing in the level of institutional herding. 
The Carhart 4-factor model, which includes Fama-French three factors and a 
momentum factor, has similar performance to the Fama-French 3-factor model, since 
the arbitrage portfolios generally have no loadings on the momentum factor. However, 
for stocks with high level of institutional herding, the long-short portfolio has 
negative loadings on the momentum factor, which leads to an even higher Carhart 4-
factor alpha on this portfolio: 7.7% per year. Again, the magnitudes of Carhart 4-
factor alphas are increasing in the level of institutional herding. 
In summary, the CAPM does not explain the returns on five zero-cost portfolios 
buying low intangible-return stocks and selling short high intangible returns. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of CAPM alphas are increasing in the level of 
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Table 6.2 Abnormal Returns on Portfolios Buying Low Intangible-Return 
Stocks and Shorting High Intangible-Return Stocks Conditional on the Level of 
Institutional Herding 
This table reports calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. L/S1 is the portfolio holding low 
intangible-return stocks and selling short high intangible-return stocks, for stocks with low level 
of institutional herding. L/S2 to L/S5 are portfolios similarly constructed for stocks with higher 
level of institutional herding. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown in 
brackets below the coefficient estimates. CAPM alphas are intercepts estimated from the CAPM 
model. Fama-French alphas are intercepts estimates from the Fama-French (1993) model. Carhart 
alphas are intercepts estimated from the Carhart 4-factor (1997) model.  
 
CAPM alphas 
 L/S1 L/S2 L/S3 L/S4 L/S5 
Alpha 0.53 0.58 0.67 0.80 1.09 
 [3.43] [3.04] [3.41] [3.88] [4.53] 
MKT -0.15 -0.10 -0.13 -0.23 -0.26 
 [-4.48] [-2.30] [-3.01] [-5.01] [-4.90] 
R-squared 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 
Fama-French alphas
 L/S1 L/S2 L/S3 L/S4 L/S5 
Alpha 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.52 
 [1.73 [1.54] [1.62] [1.91] [2.47] 
MKT -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 [-0.62] [0.38] [0.57] [-0.27] [0.25] 
SMB 0.15 0.39 0.38 0.20 0.26 
 [3.22] [6.97] [6.60] [3.31] [3.86] 
HML 0.41 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.83 
 [7.31] [6.72] [8.25] [9.22] [10.37] 
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.34 
Carhart alphas 
 L/S1 L/S2 L/S3 L/S4 L/S5 
Alpha 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.64 
 [1.54] [1.27] [1.69] [1.98] [2.99] 
MKT -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 [-0.51] [0.54] [0.48] [-0.35] [-0.17] 
SMB 0.15 0.39 0.38 0.20 0.28 
 [3.15] [6.86] [6.61] [3.35] [4.10] 
HML 0.42 0.46 0.56 0.65 0.81 
 [7.33] [6.79] [8.14] [9.10] [10.14] 
MOM 0.02 0.04 [-0.02 -0.02 -0.12 
 [0.64] [1.04] [-0.49] [-0.55] [-2.49] 
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.35 
 
institutional herding. The Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models explain 
the returns on four zero-cost portfolios with low and median levels of institutional 
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herding, but fail to explain the returns on the long/short portfolio for high 
institutional-herding stocks. Again, the magnitudes of 3-factor and 4-factor alphas are 
increasing in the level of institutional herding. I conclude from the results that 
institutional trading tends to exacerbate market overreaction to intangible information, 
magnifying the mispricings. 
 
6.2 Discussions 
The previous results establish that institutional investors buy shares in herds in 
response to positive intangible information and sell shares in herds in response to 
negative intangible information. Their trading tends to exacerbate market 
overreaction to intangible information and destabilize asset prices. How do these 
findings fit with the literature on institutional herding and institutional trading? 
The possibility of institutional investment managers to trade in herds and the 
tendency of this herd-like behavior to destabilize asset prices has been demonstrated 
in the literature (see, e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1992; Goldman and Slezak, 2003 and others). The empirical evidence of herding by 
institutions has relatively been weak (see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992; Wermers, 1999 and others). In terms of the impact of institutional herding on 
stock prices, the general conclusion from the empirical literature is that institutional 
herding helps to speed the price-adjustment process. For example, Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) and Sias (2004) report that herding by institutional investors tends to improve 
the informativeness of stock prices. Sias, Starks and Titman (2006) examine the lead-
lag relation between changes in institutional ownership and stock returns. They find 
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that trading by institutions helps information transmission into stock prices in an 
efficient way. 
The findings reported in this study have interesting implications for these 
previous studies. The main difference between this study and the previous literature is 
that I discriminate between tangible and intangible components of stock returns. My 
findings that institutional ownership responds positively to favorable tangible 
information and that the stock price response to tangible information does not reverse 
subsequently are consistent with the interpretation that trading by institutions helps 
stock prices efficiently incorporate the tangible component of information. However, 
this study reports that it is the institutional response to intangible information that 
contributes to market overreaction. It is possible that this study is able to detect such 
institutional overreaction because of the benefits of distinguishing between tangible 
and intangible information. 
To provide evidence on this conjecture, I independently sort stocks into 25 
portfolios based on past 1-year tangible returns and the level of institutional herding. 
Panel B of Table 6.1 reports mean returns on the 25 portfolios. The results show that 
conditional on the level of institutional herding, there is no difference in mean returns 
between stocks with low and high past tangible returns. The results are consistent 
with the interpretation that institutional trading (herding) facilitates tangible 





In this chapter, I examine the robustness of my results based on the herding and VAR 
analyses to a number of changes in the experimental design. Specifically, I 
distinguish between stocks in and outside of the S&P 500 Index, redo the VAR 
analysis for two different subperiods, and for distinct subgroups of 13f institutions. 
 
7.1 Effect of Indexing 
The behavior of index funds can potentially bias the previous results especially for 
the herding analysis, since index funds trade passively to hold or track the 
performance of a pre-specified stock index. Due to the unavailability of the 
information on the holdings of index funds, I distinguish between stocks in and 
outside of the S&P 500 Index and repeat the herding analysis for both groups of 
stocks. 
Table 7.1 presents the results. Panel A of Table 7.1 shows the herding results for 
the stocks not in the S&P 500 Index and Panel B shows the results for the stocks in 
the S&P 500 Index. The results indicate that the U-shape relation between the 
unconditional herding measure and intangible returns remains for stocks excluding 
those in the S&P 500 Index. Similar to the whole-sample results, the tendency of 
institutions to buy in herds is increasing in past intangible returns and the tendency of 
institutions to sell in herds is decreasing in past intangible returns. Not surprisingly, 
the herding measures are higher for stocks in the S&P 500 Index. 
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Table 7.1 Institutional Herding on Stocks Outside of and in the S&P 500 
Index  
At the end of each June between 1981 and 2004, 5-quintile portfolios are formed based on past 1-
year intangible returns, which are residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged 
book-to-market ratio and book returns. The herding measure, ,i tHM , for a given stock-year equals  
, , , ,| [ ] | | [ ] |i t i t i t i tp E p E p E p− − − , where ,i tp equals the proportion of institutions trading stock i 
during year t that are buyers. The proxy used for ,[ ] |i tE p is the proportion of all stock trades by 
institutional investment managers during year t that are buys. , ,| [ ] |i t i tE p E p− is calculated under 
the null hypothesis that institutional managers trade independently. The conditional herding 
measures, ,i tBHM and ,i tSHM for a given stock-year equal , , ,| [ ]i t i t i tHM p E p> and 
, , ,| [ ]i t i t i tHM p E p< respectively. Membership of a stock-year requires that at least 2 institutions 
traded the stock in the particular year. Panel A reports the results for the stocks excluding those in 
the S&P 500 Index. Panel B reports the results for the stocks in the S&P 500 Index. 
 
 
Panel A Institutional Herding on the Stocks Excluding those in the S&P 500 Index 
Intangible Return 
  Low P2 P3 P4 High 
Panel A1: Unconditional Herding Measure HM 
Median 0.0416 0.0340 0.0355 0.0432 0.0647 
signrank Z-stat 49 41 41 46 54 
Mean 0.0727 0.0652 0.0653 0.0740 0.0897 
T-stat 56 48 48 53 63 
# of stock-years 10202 9363 8974 8814 9259 
Panel A2: Herding Measure Conditional on Buying BHM 
Median 0.0512 0.0494 0.0560 0.0656 0.0907 
signrank Z-stat 40 37 41 45 54 
Mean 0.0800 0.0747 0.0788 0.0867 0.1029 
T-stat 48 44 49 55 69 
# of stock-years 5363 5159 5316 5551 6470 
Panel A3: Herding Measure Conditional on Selling SHM 
Median 0.0316 0.0200 0.0141 0.0140 0.0149 
signrank Z-stat 29 20 14 15 14 
Mean 0.0944 0.0818 0.0805 0.0819 0.0933 
T-stat 0.0645 0.0536 0.0456 0.0524 0.0592 
# of stock-years 4839 4204 3658 3263 2789 
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Panel B Institutional Herding on the Stocks in the S&P 500 Index 
Intangible Return 
  Low P2 P3 P4 High 
Panel A1: Unconditional Herding Measure HM 
Median 0.0576 0.0462 0.0465 0.0510 0.0673 
signrank Z-stat 33 38 41 42 39 
Mean 0.0990 0.0920 0.0938 0.0957 0.1108 
T-stat 33 38 40 43 43 
# of stock-years 2018 2917 3349 3476 2766 
Panel A2: Herding Measure Conditional on Buying BHM 
Median 0.0589 0.0555 0.0648 0.0753 0.0992 
signrank Z-stat 19 23 25 29 32 
Mean 0.1071 0.1082 0.1134 0.1122 0.1228 
T-stat 22 27 31 36 42 
# of stock-years 738 1129 1355 1582 1643 
Panel A3: Herding Measure Conditional on Selling SHM 
Median 0.0572 0.0438 0.0426 0.0416 0.0422 
signrank Z-stat 27 31 32 31 23 
Mean 0.0944 0.0818 0.0805 0.0819 0.0933 
T-stat 25 26 27 26 21 
# of stock-years 1280 1788 1994 1894 1123 
 
 
7.2 Subperiod Analysis  
The sample in this study (from 1981 to 2004) covers a period with sustained price 
runups of technology stocks, followed by a large price decline, the period often 
referred to as the Internet bubble. There is some evidence that institutions rode the 
price bubble of technology stocks (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). These issues raise 
the concern that the time-series event may drive the results. To address this concern, I 
split the sample into two subperiods, 1981-1992 and 1993-2004, and repeat the VAR 
analysis for each subperiod. 
Panels A and B of Table 7.2 present the VAR parameter estimates for each 
subperiod. The results reveal stronger reversal of past intangible returns and  
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Table 7.2 Firm-level VAR Model Parameter Estimates: Subperiod Analysis 
The table reports the VAR parameter estimates from the annual panel for two subperiods: 1981-
1992 in Panel A and 1993-2004 in Panel B. The model state variables include the market-adjusted 
log stock returns, market-adjusted intangible returns, and market-adjusted institutional ownership. 
Intangible returns are residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged book-to-market 
ratio and book returns. I report both the clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1983 and 1993) and 
robust jackknife standard errors (Shao and Rao, 1993). Since stock returns are the sum of tangible 
returns and intangible returns, the true coefficients for intangible returns in the regressions are the 
sum of the coefficients for stock returns and intangible returns in each equation. 
 
Panel A: VAR Model Parameter Estimates for 1981-1992 







Return 0.0452  0.0611  -0.0937  -0.0370  
Clustered S.E. 0.0105  0.0462  0.0253  0.0239  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0115  0.0551  0.0345  0.0270  
Intangible return -0.0492  0.6514  -0.2770  0.0028  
Clustered S.E. 0.0067  0.0286  0.0323  0.0154  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0066  0.0273  0.0318  0.0175  
Institutional Ownership 0.0071  0.0483  0.0268  0.9276  
Clustered S.E. 0.0035  0.0048  0.0036  0.0066  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0036  0.0047  0.0044  0.0073  
 
Panel B: VAR Model Parameter Estimates for 1993-2004 







Return 0.0720  -0.0097  -0.1262  -0.0759  
Clustered S.E. 0.0179  0.0736  0.0441  0.0340  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0189  0.0842  0.0502  0.0340  
Intangible return -0.0609  0.5551  -0.2823  0.0288  
Clustered S.E. 0.0059  0.0542  0.0536  0.0269  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0060  0.0586  0.0568  0.0263  
Institutional Ownership 0.0060  0.0643  0.0295  0.9460  
Clustered S.E. 0.0039  0.0082  0.0052  0.0092  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0036  0.0086  0.0051  0.0093  
 
institutional response to intangible information for the subperiod 1993-2004. 
However, the results are qualitatively similar for the two subperiods, indicating that 
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the whole sample results, as shown in Table 4.2, are not driven by a particular 
subperiod. In other words, the Internet bubble does not drive the results of this study. 
 
7.3 Different Types of Institutions 
CDA Spectrum classifies 13f institutions into five types according to Standard and 
Poor's definition of the institution's primary line of business: banks, insurance 
companies, investment companies, independent investment advisors, and others (such 
as foundations, university endowments, ESOPs, internally managed pension funds, 
and individuals who invest others' money who are not otherwise categorized). This 
information allows us to investigate whether a particular group of institutions drives 
the trading pattern observed at the aggregate level. Since the classification of 
institutional types is not proper in year 1998 and beyond,24 I estimate the VAR model 
for each type of institutions using the data from 1981 to 1997. 
Table 7.3 reports the results. Panels A, B, C, D, E, F present the VAR parameter 
estimates for aggregate institutions, banks, insurance companies, investment 
companies, independent investment advisors, and others respectively. The results 
indicate that the observed trading behavior of aggregate institutions is not driven by a 
particular group of institutions, although banks, investment companies and 
independent investment advisors exhibit stronger response to intangible information. 
                                                 
24 Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) pointed out that, "The number of institutions identified as 
banks, insurance companies, investment companies, and independent investment advisors (types 1, 2, 3, 
and 4) is not proper in 1998 and beyond because of a mapping error that occurred when TFN 
integrated data from the former Technimetrics. Many of these institutions were and are still improperly 
classified as type 5 (endowments and "others"). For example, in the first quarter of 1999, the number 
of independent investment advisors drops from over 1200 to about 200. TFN regrets that the problem 
occurred but they have no plans to fix the problem." 
(http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/tfn/sp34/doc.shtml) 
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Table 7.3 Firm-level VAR Model Parameter Estimates for Different Types of 
Institutions  
The table reports the VAR parameter estimates from the annual panel for different types of 
institutions: aggregate in Panel A, banks in Panel B, insurance companies in Panel C, investment 
companies in Panel D, independent investment advisors in Panel E, and others in Panel F for the 
period 1981-1997. The model state variables include the market-adjusted log stock returns, 
market-adjusted intangible returns, and market-adjusted institutional ownership. Intangible returns 
are residuals of the regressions of past 1-year returns on lagged book-to-market ratio and book 
returns. I report both the clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1983 and 1993) and robust jackknife 
standard errors (Shao and Rao, 1993). Since stock returns are the sum of tangible returns and 
intangible returns, the true coefficients for intangible returns in the regressions are the sum of the 
coefficients for stock returns and intangible returns in each equation. 
 
Panel A: Aggregate 







Return 0.0468  0.0431  -0.0752  -0.0373  
Clustered S.E. 0.0080  0.0331  0.0189  0.0228  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0101  0.0435  0.0277  0.0225  
Intangible return -0.0495  0.6415  -0.2697  0.0040  
Clustered S.E. 0.0048  0.0210  0.0229  0.0168  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0049  0.0214  0.0248  0.0154  
Institutional Ownership 0.0077  0.0608  0.0253  0.9272  
Clustered S.E. 0.0032  0.0061  0.0025  0.0047  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0038  0.0055  0.0033  0.0055  
 
Panel B: Banks 







Return 0.0451  0.0429  -0.0693  0.1028  
Clustered S.E. 0.0083  0.0335  0.0193  0.0481  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0111  0.0467  0.0313  0.0520  
Intangible return -0.0496  0.6395  -0.2632  0.0518  
Clustered S.E. 0.0050  0.0216  0.0242  0.0265  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0052  0.0227  0.0267  0.0268  
Institutional Ownership 0.0037  0.0068  0.0083  0.8583  
Clustered S.E. 0.0009  0.0017  0.0012  0.0134  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0009  0.0018  0.0015  0.0148  
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Panel C: Insurance Companies 







Return 0.0425  0.0519  -0.0639  -0.0195  
Clustered S.E. 0.0083  0.0388  0.0228  0.0590  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0112  0.0618  0.0385  0.0824  
Intangible return -0.0473  0.6466  -0.2632  -0.0176  
Clustered S.E. 0.0055  0.0229  0.0246  0.0453  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0059  0.0242  0.0282  0.0424  
Institutional Ownership 0.0020  0.0012  0.0015  0.8414  
Clustered S.E. 0.0005  0.0014  0.0009  0.0171  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0005  0.0019  0.0011  0.0217  
 
Panel D: Investment Companies 







Return 0.0402  0.0623  -0.0682  -0.1221  
Clustered S.E. 0.0084  0.0402  0.0253  0.0749  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0104  0.0631  0.0334  0.0756  
Intangible return -0.0472  0.6552  -0.2575  0.0073  
Clustered S.E. 0.0059  0.0248  0.0232  0.0527  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0062  0.0293  0.0255  0.0573  
Institutional Ownership 0.0010  0.0220  0.0025  0.8001  
Clustered S.E. 0.0005  0.0046  0.0015  0.0181  




Panel E: Independent Investment Advisors 







Return 0.0445  0.0490  -0.0777  -0.1181  
Clustered S.E. 0.0077  0.0325  0.0199  0.0406  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0101  0.0443  0.0231  0.0435  
Intangible return -0.0490  0.6459  -0.2694  -0.0128  
Clustered S.E. 0.0049  0.0213  0.0233  0.0320  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0051  0.0229  0.0261  0.0388  
Institutional Ownership 0.0034  0.0391  0.0087  0.8648  
Clustered S.E. 0.0013  0.0040  0.0026  0.0162  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0014  0.0041  0.0029  0.0126  
 
Panel F: Others 







Return 0.0418  0.0557  -0.0729  0.0169  
Clustered S.E. 0.0089  0.0394  0.0260  0.0606  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0101  0.0442  0.0280  0.0742  
Intangible return -0.0480  0.6469  -0.2593  -0.0300  
Clustered S.E. 0.0064  0.0233  0.0256  0.0469  
Jackknife S.E. 0.0069  0.0261  0.0285  0.0576  
Institutional Ownership 0.0022  -0.0054  0.0019  0.8883  
Clustered S.E. 0.0007  0.0013  0.0008  0.0208  







A large body of literature suggests that market overreaction is an important source of 
the superior performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks. To understand 
market overreaction, this thesis examines the trading behavior of institutional 
investors, which are becoming increasingly important in equity markets. In particular, 
I address the following question: given that previous empirical evidence suggests that 
market overreaction is a driving force of the book-to-market effect, do sophisticated 
players in the stock market, namely institutional investors, trade against this 
mispricing? The novel feature of the empirical design is the focus on market 
overreaction to intangible information, which has been shown by Daniel and Titman 
(2006) to drive the book-to-market effect. 
I find that institutional investors buy stocks in herds in response to positive 
intangible information and sell stocks in herds in response to negative intangible 
information. Stated alternatively, rather than trade against mispricing, institutional 
investors trade in the direction of the mispricing. 
To examine the destabilizing effects of institutional trading on stock prices, I 
independently sort stocks into 25 portfolios based on past 1-year intangible returns 
and the level of institutional herding in the past 1 year. I then construct five zero-cost 
portfolios buying low intangible-return stocks and selling high intangible-return 
stocks, conditional on the level of institutional herding. For stocks with high level of 
institutional herding, this investment strategy yields an average annual return of 
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11.1% and an annual Carhart 4-factor alpha of 7.7%. A similar strategy using stocks 
with low level of institutional herding generates an average annual return of only 
5.2% and an annual Carhart 4-factor alpha of only 2.8%. The results indicate strong 
interaction effects between institutional herding and market overreaction to intangible 
information, and reveal an important link between institutional trading (herding) and 
the book-to-market effect. 
The focus of this thesis is on the trading behavior and trading impact of 
institutional investors on asset prices. An unexplored question is how the trading 
behavior and trading impact of institutional investors are related to their performance. 
When asset prices and returns are endogenous, institutions as a group may improve 
their performance even though their trading has a destabilizing effect on asset prices. 
To illustrate this possibility, I track the difference in the performance of an 
aggregate institutional portfolio and an individuals' portfolio from April 1980 to 
December 2004 in Figure 8.1. Had we invested $1 in the aggregate institutional 
portfolio on March 31, 1980 and reinvested all the distributions back into the 
portfolio, this investment would have grown to $25.35 on December 31, 2004. A $1 
investment in the aggregate individual portfolio would have been worth $21.89 on 
December 31, 2004. The annualized returns to these portfolios are 13.95 percent and 
13.28 percent, respectively. The results reveal that institutions outperformed 
individuals during the sample period. To examine the link between the superior 
institutional performance and destabilizing trading impact of institutions is a 


















































































































Figure 8.1: Difference in Return on Institutional Portfolio Relative to 
Individuals' Portfolio. The figure tracks the difference in the value of one dollar invested on 
March 31, 1980, in the portfolio of stocks held by institutions versus an equivalent investment in 
the portfolio of stocks held by individuals. Monthly returns are calculated as the value-weighted 
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Industries most likely to have extreme intangible returns include the computer 
software industry, the computer hardware industry and the pharmaceutical products 
industry. The computer software industry includes firms in the subindustries of 
computer programming and data processing (SIC 7370-7372), information retrieval 
services (SIC 7375-7375), and computer integrated service design (SIC 7373); the 
computer hardware industry includes office computers (SIC 3570-3579), computers 
(SIC 3680), computers-mini (SIC 3681), computers-mainframe (SIC 3682), 
computers-terminals (SIC 3683), computers-disk and tape drives (SIC 3684), 
computers-optical scanners (SIC 3685), computers-optical graphics (SIC 3686), 
computers-optical office automatic systems (SIC 3687), computers-optical 
peripherals (SIC 3688), computers-optical equipment (SIC 3689), magnetic and 
optical recording media (SIC 3695); the pharmaceutical products industry includes 
drugs (SIC 2830), biological products (SIC 2831), medical products (SIC 2833), 
pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834), in vitro, in vivo diagnostics (SIC 2835) and 
biological products, except diagnostics (SIC 2836). 
Industries most likely to have zero intangible returns include the utilities 
industry, the banking industry and the trading industry. The utilities industry includes 
firms in the subindustries of electric, gas, sanitary services (SIC 4900), electric 
services (SIC 4910-4911), natural gas transmission (SIC 4920-4922), natural gas 
transmission-distribution (SIC 4923), natural gas distribution (SIC 4924-4925), 
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electric and other services combined (SIC 4930-493), gas and other services 
combined (SIC 4932), combination utilities (SIC 4939) and water supply (SIC 4940-
4942);the banking industry includes depository institutions (SIC 6000), federal 
reserve banks (SIC 6010-6019), commercial banks (SIC 6020), national commercial 
banks (SIC 6021), state banks - Fed Reserve System (SIC 6022), state banks - not Fed 
Reserve System (SIC 6023-6024), national banks - Fed Reserve System (SIC 6025), 
national banks - not Fed Reserve System (SIC 6026), national banks - not FDIC (SIC 
6027), banks (SIC 6028-6029, 6040-6059), savings institutions (SIC 6030-6036), 
credit unions (SIC 6060-6062), foreign banks (SIC 6080-6082), functions related to 
deposit banking (SIC 6090-6099), nondepository credit institutions (SIC 6100), 
federal credit agencies (SIC 6110-6111), FNMA (SIC6112-6113), S&Ls (SIC 6120-
6129), agricultural credit institutions (SIC 6130-6139), personal credit institutions, 
beneficial (SIC 6140-6149), business credit institutions (SIC 6150-6159), mortgage 
bankers (SIC 6160-6169), finance lessors (SIC 6170-6179), financial services (SIC 
6190-6199); the trading industry includes security and commodity brokers (SIC 6200-
6299), holding, other investment offices (SIC 6700), holding offices (SIC 6710-6719), 
investment offices (SIC 6720-6722, 6740-6779), management investment, closed-end 
(SIC 6723), unit investment trusts (SIC 6724), face-amount certificate offices (SIC 
6725), unit investment trusts, closed-end (SIC 6726), trusts (SIC 6730-6733), 
miscellaneous investing (SIC 6790-6791), oil royalty traders (SIC 6792), commodity 
traders (SIC 6793), patent owners & lessors (SIC 6794), mineral royalty traders (SIC 
6795), REIT(SIC 6798), Investors, NEC (SIC 6799). 
